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ABSTRACT 
1. Introduction 
AN AXIOMATIZED FAMILY OF POWER INDICES 
FOR SIMPLE n-PERSON GA1'1ES 
In Deegan and Packel (1977) the authors presented a new p ower index for 
simple games based upon the ideas of minimal winning coalitions and equal 
distribution of payoffs among members of such coalitions. In this paper we 
develop a family of such indices by considering various probability distri-
butions for coali tion formation. An axiomatic characterizati on of these 
indices is then developed. After comparing our approach with that of Blair 
In this probabilistic generalization of the Deegan-Packel power index, (1976) and Dubey (1976), we discuss and rationalize some of the properties 
new family of power indices based on the notions of minimal winning coali-
"cons and equal division of pnyoffs is developed. These indices are axioma-
:ically characterized and comp ared to other similarly characterized indices. 
idditionally, a dual family or minimal blocking coalition indices and their 
:haracterization axioms is presented . 
and paradoxes which may ob tain for our indices. Finally, we develop a family 
of dual power indices and present the altered axioms which characterize them. 
2. Probabilistic Indices and their Characterization 
Let v:2N �> {0,1}, v(�) = 0, be a simple n-person game on the player set 
N 
= {1,2, . . . ,n}. We assu.'Ue throughout that vis monotone (S £ T => v(S):s_ v(T)), but 
we do not generally require superadditivity. We denote the class of such games 
by CN. 
Let f:2N--"' (0,=) be a svimnetric Cls[ = [Tl � f(S) = f(T)) function on 
the coalitions. For any v s CN let M(v) denote the minimal winning coalitions 
in v. For a given f and v define a probability distribution function Pf (v) on 
the co alitions in v by 
Pf(v)(S) [c/(v)]-1 
0 
{f (S) 
if S � M(v) 
if S E M(v) 
f 
where ci. (v) l 
S s M(v) 
f(S) is the normalization factor for the distribution. 
We may then define a probabilistic power index pf: CN _,. IB. n as follows: 
f 
P. (v) l 
l [Pf(v)(S)]v(S)/[S[. 
s � i 
2 
te r a tionale for this approach is based upon the modeling assumption that a 
Jalition S, with a probability Pf(v) (S) of forming, distributes its payoff 
'.S) equally among its I S  I mer.,bers. The fact that Pf (v) (S) is nonzero if and 
1ly if S is a minimal winning coalition reflects the assumption that only mini-
al winning coalitions can successfully form. Discussion and poss ib le justifi-
ation of th ese assumptions tas been pr esented in Deegan and Packel (1977) and 
t greater length in Deegan and Packel (1976). In these earlier works, only 
he special case where f = 1 and (v) = iN(v) J was considered. 
We need the following def rnitions. A player i is a _dummy in a game v if 
r(S U {i}) = v(S) for all SS N (equivalently, i belongs to no minimal winnin6 
:oalitions) . Player s i and j are symmetric in v if v (SU { i}) = v(S \J {j}) for 
::ell S SN - {i,j}. 
Given v, w s CN, we defimo vVw and vi\w e: CN as follows: 
(vVw) (S) = {l
 if v(S) = 1 or w(S) = 1 
0 otherwise 
(vAw) 
(S) = {l if v(S) = 1 and w(S) = 1 
0 otherwise. 
We say that, v,w E: CN are mergeable if 
S E: M ( v) and T E: M ( w) =--;, S 't T and T � S . 
This mergeability cond ition is equivalent to requiring that [M(vYw)J 
[H(w) l and will be used in the characterization that follows. 
[M(y) I + 
Theorem 1. For a given symmetric func t ion f: 2N + (O,oo), the function p:.:: CN + lR
n 
is the unique power index satisfying the axioms: 
Al: 
A2: 
A3: 
A4: 
p � (v) = 0 <=:> i is a dummy player. 
l 
c 
If i and j are symmetr ic in v, then p�(v) 
l 
n 
f f p.(v) = l for all v E CN. 
i;;;l i r 
If v and w are mergeable in CN, then 
f( V) _ a.f(v) pf(v) + c/(w) /(w) p v w - f f 
a. (v) + a. (w) 
f pj(v).
3 
Proof. Given p� (v) = 5l. [Pf(v)(S)]v(S)/JsJ, we first show that Al through A4 -- l 'll 
are satisfied. Property Al holds since 
- F p�(v) = 0 <=:> P-(v)(S)v(S) ]. 0 for every S containing i 
<=:> Pf(v)(S) 0 for every S e: M(v) containing i 
<=:> no S e: M(v) can contain i 
<=:> i is a dummy. 
The second axiom is satisfied by the symmetry between i and j and the symmetry 
of f. For A3 we have 
w f I p. <v> = 
i =l ]. 
n 
[Pf(v)(S)]v(S)/!sl I I 
i =l S:;,i 
I I [Pf(v) (S)]v (S) / ! s l 
ScN ie:S 
I f P (v)v(S) 
SSN 
j [a.f (v) J-1f(S) 
S�M(v) 1 
. 
F 
Finally, A4 holds for p- since , for each i s N, 
.;: 
p�(vVw) 1 
l [Pf (vVw) (S)] (vVw) (S) I\ S \ 
s� i 
[a.f(vVw))-l [ l f ( S ) v (S) / l s l + 
Si;;M(v) 
iES 
l f(S)w(S)/ Js J l 
Sd1(w) 
iES 
1 
f 
-- [ f( ) f f 
a. (v)+a.
f
(w) 
a. v p i (v) + a. (w)p�(w)].1 
ersely , suppose Al-A4 are satisfied by rome funct ion /: CN + IR 
n. 
4 
any v E �, enu.'llerate the members of M(v) as s1, s2, 
.et v
k 
E � denot e the game for which 
S and for each m 
vk(S) 
:e M(vk) 
{1 if s 2 sk 
0 otherwise 
{Sk}' a singleton set, the vk are mergeable and v = v1vv2V • •  .'Vvm. 
any i E N and any vk' axioms Al, AZ, and A3 re qu ire t hat 
P� (vk) ={l/ \5iz \ if i s 5t<.- 0 otherw:Lse 
rrg A4 re ad ily extended to a merge of m ra ther than 2 gam es , we ha ve 
.;: 
P j_ (v) 
m - f 
l ,/'- (vk) P • (vk) 
k=l 1 
m f I a <vk> 
k=l 
-
1 
m f I . [a.I(v))- l ,:i (vk)vk(Sk)/ Sk ik=l 
m 
[a.f(v))-1 l f(Sk)v(Sk)/\Ski 
�l 
5 
3. Examples, Properties, and Paradoxes 
The well known power indices of Shapley-Shubik''and Banzhaf have heen 
developed (e.g., Blair (1976) o r Dubey (1976)) as sp ecia l cases of wha t Bla ir 
calls P-values in a manner similar to our approach, although their probability 
distribution P on the coalitions must be formulated in a slightly different 
manner. More significantly, however, the co ntributions to the "payoff" of a 
player i in coalition S are not dete rmined by e qual subdivision [v(S)/ISJ], 
but rather by what player i can contribute to the coalition S [v(SU{i}) - v(S)]. 
In add iti on , the family of " indic es " thus obtained may then require normaliza-
tion and no coherent set of axioms seems to be availab le for these normalized 
indices on CN. 
The differences in assumptions for the Deegan-Packel, Shapley-Shu bik , and 
Banzhaf indices naturally give rise to significantly different models of a priori 
power determination. While their re lative merits might be deb a te d at length it 
seems likely that, as in so many asp ects of n-perso n game theory, each assumption 
has a domain of more appropriate applicability. For example, the distr ibu tio n 
P in Bla ir ' s approach is independent of the game v, while our distribution Pf(v) 
depends on the coalition structure of the game under consideration. The 
former a ppro ach is somewhat more pleasing in that it generalizes smo othly to 
provide a family of linear "values" on the class GN of characteristic f unc tion 
n 
games on N witho ut an efficiency axiom ( L P . (v) = v(N)). In c ontra st , our 
i=l 1 
approach allows incorporation of the nature of each particular game in deter-
mining power, while extension to a value on GN requires a generalization of 
the minimal winning c oali tion concept (see Deegan and Packel (1977) for some 
specialized r esul ts in this direction). l !i:'f (v)(S) ] v (S) I IS I 
S1i 
·q.E.D. Ret urning to the family of indice s defined by 
f 
Pi (v) l [Pf(v)(S)] v(S)/JsJ,
SH 
. 
6 
e that setting f :: 1 (or any constant value on the minimal winning coalitions) 
lds the index p: CN -+ IR n defined by 
Pi (v) 
I M(v) \-1 l 1/ls\ , and first presented in Deegan and Packel (1976).
S£M(v) 
i£S 
s specific index, like those of Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf, admits a variety 
"paradoxes" when considered on the domain of weighted voting games. It is 
: an exercise to demonstrate that the paradoxes of quarreling, added 
.ght, and new members (e.g., see Brams (1975), Brams and Affuso (1976), 
Deegan and Packel (1976)) can be exhibited for p. While these paradoxes 
seem surprisi.."lg to some, they appear to be present for all power indi1:es 
l may (see Raanen (1976)) in a sense be inevitable. 
For the sake of completeness, we feel obliged to point out another 
:eresting paradox which occurs for p but apparently not for the family of 
!ices in Blair's approach. Consider a simple example. The weighted voting 
ne v = [S; 3, 2, 1, 1, 1) (a quota of 5 with the 5 players having respective 
ights of 3, 2, 1, 1, and 1) yields power values p(v) =(18/60, 9/60, 11/60, 
160, 11/60), showing that tl:.e "l vote" players have more power than the 
vote" player The impact of this paradox on the interpretation of p \and 
the v(S)/!sl approach) as an a priori measure of power in certain poli.tical 
ting situations is open for discussion. Sociologists have, in fact, argued 
• g., Caplow (196.8)) that situations where minor players possess greater 
tential for power are not anomalous, but occur rather frequently. 
We note, by way of balance, that the indices of Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf 
n also be shown to exhibit counter-intuitive properties. In particular, it 
.s been shown by Straffin (1976) that both the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf 
Ldices are susceptible to being altered (in the context of weighted voting 
7 
games) by players "quarreling" with a dummy player (i.e., refusing to join the 
same coalition). This cannot happen in our minimal winning coalition approach. 
4. Duality 
Every v E CN gives rise to a natural dual game v* E CN defined as follows:
v*(S) {l if v(N-S)=O 0 if v(N-S)=l" 
Thus a coalition S is winning (v*(S)=l) in the dual game if and only if it can 
block arty other coalition from winning in the original game v. 
We now define a family of dual indices, *f n p : CN-+ IR by *f f p (v) = p (v*).
Intuitively, such indices measure (for a game v), the power of each player to 
block winning coalitions from forming (or to prevent passage of motions). It
is worth noting �hat the indices of Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf are each equal 
to their duals, thus incorporating the power to initiate and the power to 
block equally. This is not generally the case for the family cf indices we 
have developed. As a result, our family of indices has the capacity to provide 
a priori assessments of both "power to initiate" and "power to block," although 
there are certain situations in which apparently unusual results are obtained. 
The family of dual indices can also be characterized a...xiomatically. The 
following lerrnna sets the stage. 
Lemma • 
Proof, 
* * 
(vAw) = v*Vw* and (vVw) = v* Aw*. 
* (vA w) (S) 1 <=> (vA w)(N-S) 0 
<=> v(N-S) = 0 or w(N-S) = 0 
<=> v*(S) = 1 or w*(S) = 1 
<=> (v*Vw*)(S) = 1 
The second equality follows from the first by the reflexive nature (v** = v) 
of the dual.
Q.E.D. 
8 
Given f: 2N + (0, 00) symme cric , and P
f 
(v) a probability distributicn on 
.J.. ,C -r 
:he coalitions of v, we define ;•(v) = a� (v* ) . 
,,f 
Thus a- (v) = l f(S). We 
St:M(v*) 
hen have: 
'heorem 2: 
·< -
T'he function p I: CN -+ IR n is the unique power index satisfyJ.ng 
he axioms: 
l*: 
2*: 
3*: 
4*: 
* f 
Pi (v) 0 <=> i is a dunmw player. 
If i and j are symmetri<: in v, * f * f then pi (v) = pj (v). 
n *f L P;(v) = l for all vs�· 
i=l - . 
If v and w have merge ab J.e duals in �, 
*f p (v :\w)
*f *f a- (v) o (v) + 
--�--a (v) + 
*f *f a (w) o-(w) 
&few> 
then 
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�oof. The fact that our ;f satisfies Al* - A3* follows dire c tly from the cor- P. Straffin (1976). ':Power Indices in Politics." Module in Applied J;fathema­
tics, Mathematical Association of America, Cornell University. 
. . 1 - f . �h l �sponcing resu ts tor p in • eorem . It suffices to observe that the 
2ts of du=q players and symmetric pairs in v are unchanged in v*. For A4* 
: use the Le=a and Theorem 1 as follows. 
*f 
p (v Aw) 
f 
p-((v Aw)i<) pf (v*Vwi') 
f ( 
*) f ( "' . f 
( 
. ) f ( . ) 
(). V 0 . \.' '�} -r Cl Wy; 0 W'", 
F c 
a.- (v'') + c/ (w1') 
*f *f *f *f a (v) p (v) + a (w) o (w) 
''f '"f 
a (v) + a (w) 
'_nally, ;f must be unique :i.n satis fying the axioms on Si s ince otherwise the 
"' 
Liqueness of p" established in Theorem 1 would be contradicted. 
Q.E.D. 
